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would permit a student to vote if he complied with the constitutional requirements and evidenced an intent not to return home.
Another factor supporting this position is the absence of a constitutional provision directly relating to student voting. As stated
by a former Attorney General, once a prospective voter complies
with the constitution, it would take a strong showing to deny
that person his right to vote.2" However, only the West Virginia
Supreme Court can determine when a voter has complied with
the constitution.
Jacob Michael Robinson

Evidence-Expert Opinion of Speed Based on
Damaged Condition of Vehicle
P's intestate was involved in a three car collision at an intersection. A police officer with four years experience on the police
force investigated the accident shortly after it occurred. The
officer was asked if he had formed an opinion, based on the
physical damage to the automobiles and the tire marks in the
intersection, whether the automobile driven by P's intestate was
moving or standing still at the time of the collision. D's objection
to the question was sustained and P was non-suited. Held, affirmed. Where a witness investigates but does not see a wreck,
he may describe to the jury signs, marks and conditions found at
the scene, including damage to the vehicle involved. These
observations, however, cannot provide a basis for an opinion by
the witness concerning the vehicle's speed because the jury is as
well qualified as the witness to determine what inferences the
facts will permit or require. Farrow v. Baugham, 266 N.C. 739,
147 S.E.2d 167 (1966).
It is within the discretion of the trial court to ascertain whether
a witness has the degree of skill, knowledge or experience not
common to laymen in a particular field that will qualify him as an
expert.' However, before the expert may render an opinion, it
must be shown that the subject matter is so distinctly related to

some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond
20 1923-1924 W. VA. Ar'Ty GEN. BmiNNAL REP. 647.

' Byrd v. Virginian By., 123 W. Va; 47, 13 S.E.2d 273 (1941).
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the knowledge of the average laymen.' Therefore, an estimation
of speed from observed data will be allowed only if it is found
to be a proper subject matter for expert opinion. Concerning this
question, the courts are in disagreement.'
The apparent majority, which holds that a determination of
speed based on damage4 to the vehicle is not a proper subject
matter for expert opinion, generally do so for one of two reasons:
either that the opinion lacks scientific or technical certainty, or the
jury is as well qualified as the witness to determine what inferences can be drawn from the facts. For example, in Union Bus
Lines v. Moulder,5 the Texas court held that expert opinion testimony based entirely on the damaged condition of the vehicles
and their positions after impact was incompetent. This witness
had been qualified as an expert by the trial court because of his
observation of numerous automobile wrecks as a police officer
and his attendance at a school at which instruction was given in
estimating speed from skid marks and apparent force of impact.
However, his opinion of speed based on damage was not competent. It was held not to relate to a matter concerning which the
expert had knowledge superior to ordinary jurors as no attempt
was made to show that he had used any technical or scientific
methods in arriving at his estimate. Similarly, in the Connecticut
case of Stephanofsky v. Hill,' the plaintiff did not object to the
qualifications of the state policeman as an expert but to the admission of his opinion of the speed at which a vehicle was
traveling before it collided with posts at a culvert. The opinion
in part was based on the position of the car after impact, i.e.,
the course taken and the distance covered. These factors were
held to involve "too many unknown elements to admit of any
EvmENcE § 13 (1954).
3 Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 146 S.E.2d 252 (1966); see Annot., 93
A.L.R.2d 287 (1964).
4 This comment attempts to focus only on the admissibility of opinion
evidence as to speed based on the condition of a motor vehicle after the
accident. However the opinion evidence in many cases is based at least in
part on other conditions observed at the accident scene, namely, marks on
the road and position of the vehicles involved. In these cases it is often
2 McConcK,

difficult to discern whether the opinion was rejected in principfe, Grasty v.

Tanner, supra note 3, or merely that it was improper because the facts on

which it was based were insufficient, Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379,

71 A.2d 560 (1950). In any event, a court that rejects the opinion when
it is based on damage and other facts would certainly reject it if based on
damage alone.
180 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
6136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560 (1950).
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degree of certainty"' since the position of the vehicle may have
been the result of something else, such as an increase of pressure
by the driver's foot on the accelerator caused by the impact. Thus,
the only facts from which speed could be determined were "the
damage to the posts and the front end of the plaintiffs car [which]
of itself afforded no sufficient basis for determining the number
of miles per hour it was traveling at the time of impact."'
Other cases, including the principal case, which have held that
opinion of speed is not a proper subject matter have reasoned
that the jury can draw a conclusion from the facts as well as the
witness. To permit the opinion would "invade the province of
the jury."9 A recent Virginia case is in accord with these decisions.
In Grasty v. Tanner,'" the court rejected an opinion as to speed by
an expert engineer based on a scientific examination of the
damaged vehicle. The Virginia court noted the conflict of authority
on the admission of such an opinion based on damage to the car,
but followed what it considered to be the greater weight of
authority.
Notwithstanding the majority view, substantial authority exists
favoring the admissibility of an expert opinion of speed which
is based in part on the damaged condition of the vehicle. In
Foreman v. Heinz," two witnesses, a sheriff and a policeman,
qualified as experts due to their experience and special training.
They estimated the speed of an automobile based on the location
and damage to the two vehicles involved, skid marks and other
physical facts. The Kansas court upheld the admission of their
testimony, stating that the weight to be given such evidence was
a matter for the jury to determine. A similar result was reached
in a recent California case'" which held that a traffic officer,
whose duties included the investigation of automobile accidents,
could qualify as an expert entitled to give an opinion respecting
the speed of an automobile based on the physical facts at the
7

1d. at 383, 71 A.2d at 562.

8 Id.

at 383-84, 71 A.2d at 562.
9When a court makes this assertion, it is obviously expressing a fear
that the jury will attach weight to an opinion merely because the witness
is respected or influential and not make an independent decision on an issue
that the jurors are capable of deciding themselves. McCormick, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 12, at 26; see Stephanofsky v. Hill, supra note 6; Grasty v. Tanner,
206 Va. 723, 146 S.E.2d 252 (1966).
10206 Va. 723, 146 S.E.2d 252 (1966).
11
2 185 Kan. 715, 347 P.2d 451 (1959).
1 Davis v, Ward, 219 Cpl. App. 2d 144, 32 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1963).
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accident scene, i.e., the damaged condition of the vehicles and
skid marks.
Opinion evidence has been admitted even in cases in which the
investigating officer found no skid marks at the accident scene to
aid his investigation. This situation is most common when the
vehicle leaves the road and collides with a fixed object. As a
result, the investigating officer is limited to the damage to the
vehicle and other property damage in formulating his opinion.
This was the case in Cross v. Estate of Patch," where the vehicle
left the road and struck two posts and a bridge. The Supreme
C6urt of Vermont concluded that a properly qualified expert could
give an opinion of the speed at which the automobile was traveling at the time of impact based on these facts. Furthermore,
opinions based entirely on damage to the vehicle by witnesses
other than investigating officers have been upheld. That the
special expertise of the witness is based solely on practical experience in appraising and viewing damaged cars rather than on
engineering knowledge has been held to affect only the weight of
testimony, not its admissibility. 4
The position of the West Virginia Supreme Court on this subject
5 an attempt was made to qualify
is not clear. In Reall v. Deiriggi,"
two state patrolmen as experts in order that they could give their
estimates of speed based on the damage to the automobile, tire
marks and property damage. 6 The refusal of the trial court to
permit their opinions was upheld by the West Virginia Supreme
Court. The court stated that the conclusions of a witness should
never be received into evidence if all the facts can be ascertained
and made intelligible to the jury or if they are such that a person
of ordinary intelligence is capable of understanding and comprehending them. In this case, since the jury was fully informed of the
conditions and had viewed the accident scene, they could determine
the rate of speed as well as the witnesses. Thus, the court apparently holds that an estimation of speed based on the damaged
condition of the vehicle is not a proper subject matter for an
expert opinion. However, in the more recent case of Butcher v.
123 Vt. 11, 178 A.2d 393 (1961).
v. Travers, 288 Mass. 156, 192 N.E. 495 (1934) (garage
mechanic); Freeman v. Scahill, 92 N.H. 471, 32 A.2d 817 (1943) (witness
with eighteen years experience in appraising and viewing damaged cars).
Is 127 W. Va. 662, 34 S.E.2d 253 (1945).
16
Record, pp. 191-93.
13

14Harrington
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Stull,'" the West Virginia court indicated that an opinion of speed
based on the damaged condition of a vehicle is a proper subject
matter for expert opinion. The court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to permit a conclusion by a witness whether an automobile
was traveling at a high rate of speed when it struck a rock ledge.
The court stated that "the opinion of a witness, who had merely
observed an automobile after it had come to rest against an
obstruction, as to its speed at the moment of impact, was properly
excluded where there was no attempt to qualify such witness as
an expert.""
Thus, the interesting question arises whether the West Virginia
Supreme Court would allow an expert such as a "traffic accident
analyse" 9 to give his opinion of speed based on the damage to the
car and its position against an object after impact. Its most recent
decision indicates that it might be willing to recognize that this
area is a proper subject matter for expert testimony. Such a view,
however, would be contrary to that of Virginia and the majority
of jurisdictions.
Louis Sweetland Southworth, 11

Property-Effect of Alteration of Recordable Instruments
X signed a deed granting property to D. Although not signed
in S's presence, S,notary public and secretary for D's attorney,
acknowledged the signature after inquiry of X and other witnesses.
Upon the return of the three page executed deed to D's attorney,
the words "and appurtenances thereunto belonging" were added to
the deed, the first page being retyped and inserted in place of the
original first page, the other two pages, containing the signature
and acknowledgment, remaining intact. This draft was returned
to X, who orally reacknowledged her signature, although no new
notarial certificate was added. The notary left the deed in possession of X. Later, D's attorney received the deed from D, and had
the deed properly recorded. Ps, heirs-at-law of X, sought to have
this deed declared void because of lack of execution or delivery.
17140 W. Va. 31, 82 S.E.2d 278 (1954).
18Supra note 17, syl. 4. (Emphasis added.)
19Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 595, 130 S.E.2d 80, 94 (1963).
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